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Wittgenstein: uma abordagem 
expressivista sobre as emoções
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Abstract: This paper aims to show that Wittgenstein’s approach to the 
concepts of sensation and emotion can shed light on many philosophical 
dilemmas that remain present in the contemporary debate. My analysis 
will start by characterizing Jesse Prinz’s approach to emotions (heavily 
influenced by the physiological theory of William James) and, then, it 
will proceed to show that Prinz is subject to the same criticisms that 
Wittgenstein expressed about William James’s theory. Finally, I will 
argue that Wittgenstein, in Philosophical Investigations, advocated for 
a peculiar kind of expressivism that, while having profound differences 
from traditional expressivism, is able to appear as a non-cognitivist 
position. I will argue further that William James’s error (and hence also 
Prinz’s) is disregarding the multiple uses of psychological terms (that 
is, to think that psychological terms have a uniform use).
Keywords: Ludwig Wittgenstein. Emotivism. Expressivism. Philosophy of 
Psychology.
Resumo: Neste trabalho, tem-se a intenção de mostrar que a abordagem 
de Wittgenstein sobre os conceitos de sensação e emoção pode lançar 
luz sobre muitos dilemas filosóficos que permanecem presentes 
no debate contemporâneo. A minha análise tem como ponto de 
partida a abordagem de Jesse Prinz sobre as emoções, a qual é 
fortemente influenciada pela teoria fisiológica de William James. Nesse 
sentido, procurarei mostrar que Prinz está sujeito as mesmas críticas 
que Wittgenstein endereçou à teoria de William James. Por fim, eu 
argumentarei que Wittgenstein, nas Investigações filosóficas, defendeu 
um tipo peculiar de expressivismo que, apesar de manter profundas 
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diferenças com o expressivismo tradicional, é capaz de figurar como 
uma posição não-cognitivista. Argumentarei, adicionalmente, que o erro 
na teoria de William James (e, portanto, também o erro de Prinz) é não 
considerar os múltiplos usos dos termos psicológicos (ou seja, pensar 
que os termos psicológicos possuem um uso uniforme).
Palavras-chave: Ludwig Wittgenstein. Emotivismo. Expressivismo. Filosofia 
da psicologia.
1 Jesse Prinz and the Non-cognitive Theory of Emotions
In the early chapters of The Emotional Construction of Morals (2007), Jesse Prinz offers a brief overview of the extensive debate on the nature 
of emotions and on how the various theoretical positions include the role 
of emotions with respect to moral psychology. Prinz explicitly argues 
that a non-cognitive theory along the lines of the James-Lange theory of 
emotions would be most appropriate to his purpose, since it treats the 
emotional states as “immediate response” for bodily stimuli: “Emotions 
are felt perceptions of bodily changes.”1
The name “James-Lange theory of emotions” is due to the well-known 
fact that William James (1884) and the Danish physiologist Carl Lange 
(1885) developed – allegedly independently – very similar theories about 
the nature of emotions. It is not surprising that the chapter on emotions of 
James’s book Principles of Psychology begins precisely with a long quote 
from Carl Lange to show what he (James) thought about the phenomenon 
of “grief.” In this emblematic passage, James describes grief in terms of 
expressive bodily behaviors, such as “walking slowly,” the “wobble,” the 
“dragging of feet,” the “weak voice,” and the “tendency to cry softly,” 
for example. After listing a series of typical behaviors that accompany grief, 
James concludes: “It is clear that grief is a bodily phenomenon, with their 
tears, red eyes and so on.”2
William James’s theory also sought to account for the way in which 
we externalize emotions through typical behaviors, such as facial 
expressions, skeletal-muscle changes and other conventional patterns 
of activities. “Fear,” for example, was regarded as an emotion often 
preceded by the characteristic behavior of “astonishment,” that is, 
“eyes and mouth open,” “raised eyebrows,” “dry salivary glands,” “cold 
sweat,” “tremors,” etc. In this respect, therefore, James’s position seems 
much more comprehensive than Lange’s, since Lange gave priority to 
1 PRINZ, J. The Emotional Construction of Morals. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
2 JAMES, W. The Principles of Psychology. New York: Cosimo, 2007, p. 1059-1060.
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strictly physical aspects, such as the change in “blood vasculature,”3 for 
example. The emphasis in typical expressive behaviors, as we shall see, 
is a key element that allows us to consider a convergence between the 
positions of James and Wittgenstein.
James was convinced, however, that the traditional research about 
emotions had focused only on “cataloging emotions,” but that no position 
sought to provide a kind of “generative principle” or the “source” of 
emotions4. James’s aim, therefore, was to offer this principle from a 
physiological perspective, endorsing a kind of reductionist naturalism. 
The great novelty consisted of the idea that primitive emotions (fear, 
anger and sadness, for example) do not cause bodily variations, but 
rather bodily expressions or variations are causes of gross emotions. This 
is clearly apparent in the following passage from Principles of Psychology:
Our natural way of thinking about these coarser emotions is that 
the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called 
the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily 
expression. My theory, on the contrary, is that the bodily changes follow 
directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the 
same changes as they occur is the emotion. Common sense says we lose 
our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; 
we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to 
be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect… [Which the 
correct order is] is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we 
strike, afraid because we tremble5.
Clearly, this way of conceiving of emotions is extremely attractive 
for any naturalistic position, since it potentially reduces all expressive 
behaviors that denote emotions to stimuli and bodily processes. Moreover, 
it also seems to offer “the generative principle” that distinguishes 
James’s position from the traditional positions. Another interesting 
aspect of this theory is the fact that it seems to involve a kind of exercise in 
mental subtraction6, and it is precisely this aspect that the contemporary 
naturalists want to rescue, since it would represent a very promising 
type of non-cognitivism7.
Wittgenstein’s criticisms of James’s theory, however, were con- 
centrated on two basic methodological aspects:
3 PRINZ, J., op. cit., p. 53.
4 JAMES, W., op. cit., p. 1064.
5 Ibid., p. 1065-1066.
6 In James’s words (see ibid., p. 1067): “If we removed all the bodily sensations of our 
consciousness of the intense emotion, we would not find anything that we left behind.” “All 
that will be left,” he adds, “is just a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception.” (See ibid., 
p. 1068): “A heartless cognition that certain circumstances are deplorable and nothing else”.
7 PRINZ, J., op. cit., p. 60.
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(1) Although the body is the central aspect of James’s theory, the 
introspective method (mental subtraction), which is used to arrive at 
such conclusions, is highly doubtful to Wittgenstein, since it is far from 
being an adequate scientific research method.
(2) From a strictly philosophical point of view, James’s theory seems to 
take a wrong type of access to the “inner experience” by not considering 
the logical connection between sensations and emotions.
In this sense, I think that, by endorsing the James-Lange theory of 
emotions, Jesse Prinz seems to be creating the same difficulties for himself. 
Before, however, addressing the minute aspects of Wittgenstein’s criticism, 
I would like to emphasize here some additional features of the James-Lange 
theory of emotions which are very favorable to Jesse Prinz’s purposes.
Insofar as emotional states are completely materialized (embodied), 
the James-Lange theory is a kind of non-cognitivism able to account 
for the immediacy of certain emotions, for instance, in cases where 
emotional responses are so immediate that it would be difficult to assume 
the intermediation of concepts, judgments or thoughts. There are many 
examples of this type of emotional responses, especially those that are 
triggered by visual perception, as a visual stimulus can trigger anger or 
compassion, for example. The James-Lange perspective, in this case, 
seems to corroborate Jesse Prinz’s hypothesis that somatic signals are 
necessary and sufficient for emotions, a hypothesis also endorsed by Paul 
Griffiths and Craig DeLancey.
The immediacy of certain emotions is obviously one of the main 
challenges faced by cognitive theories of emotions. In contrast, the 
contemporary cognitivists, especially Robert Solomon, William Lyons, 
Martha Nussbaum, and George Pitcher, often claim that, in order to 
deny the cognitive nature of emotions, non-cognitivist philosophers 
fail to explain the “intentionality” inherent in them. In other words, the 
cognitivists cannot explain how cognitions may be involved in immediate 
emotional responses; the non-cognitivists, moreover, cannot explain the 
alleged intentionality of emotions.
The non-cognitivist philosopher should also explain the cases in 
which cognition seems to be involved in emotional responses, especially 
those that do not seem immediate. Therefore, Jesse Prinz believes that 
the James-Lange theory of emotions must face at least two problems to 
be entirely non-cognitivist:
(1) The first problem (which Prinz calls the “Rational Assessment 
Problem”8) consists precisely of dispelling the suspicion that our usual 
way of talking about emotions necessarily involves typically rational or 
8 PRINZ, J., op. cit., p. 60.
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cognitive “words” (i.e., we talk about “justified emotions” or “non-justified 
emotions,” “adequate” or “inadequate,” “warranted” or “unwarranted,”9 
etc.). According to Prinz, this could suggest that emotions have a cognitive 
dimension while there is evidence that cognition is not necessary for an 
emotion. As suggested by Prinz10, the solution to this dilemma involves 
adopting a naturalistic theory of representation, primarily along the lines 
of Fred Dretske’s position, but which also finds support in the positions 
of Jerry Fodor and Ruth Millikan, for example.
The general aim is to maintain that emotions are “natural repre- 
sentations” which, as such, are designed for a specific purpose (in this 
case, they would represent “concerns”), the same manner as smoke 
detectors are designed for the purpose, or function, of reliably indicating 
the presence of fire. In this point of view, “pain,” for example, would 
represent “physical disease,” insofar as physical diseases reliably trigger 
pain, but also because this device has been selected (evolutionarily) for 
this purpose. The idea of a natural representation (as a representation 
that occurs outside the mind) involves adopting a computational theory 
of the mind (with “mental files” and “calibration mechanisms,” etc.), 
which, however, I will not present here11.
(2) The second problem (which Prinz calls the “Somatic Similarity 
Problem”12) consists of providing a satisfactory answer to the apparent 
lack of “bodily patterns” to account for the numerous “somatic signs,” 
that is, “different emotions are often associated with the same somatic 
changes.” For example, “anger” and “indignation” are different emotions, 
because someone might be angry and not be indignant, but usually they 
are associated to the same patterns of expressive behavior13. If there 
was a single body pattern for each emotion, then we would expect that 
“anger” and “indignation” possessed different somatic signs. This, 
however, is also evidence that emotions and other internal processes 
have very peculiar characteristics.
The solution offered by Prinz for the “Somatic Similarity Problem” also 
involves the idea of “emotion-as-natural-representation-for-a-particular-
purpose,” because, insofar as similar signals may represent different 
mechanisms, a somatic signal of the same bodily pattern can have 
different meanings in different occasions. The meaning of the somatic 
signal of a bodily pattern would depend on the mental mechanism that 
9 PRINZ, J., op. cit., p. 60.
10 Ibid., p. 64-66.
11 DRETSKE, F. Explaining Behaviour: Reasons in a World of Causes. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1988; 
MILLIKAN, R. White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995.
12 PRINZ, J., op. cit., p. 65.
13 GOODMAN, R. Wittgenstein and William James. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002, p. 61.
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generated the pattern. Nevertheless, it is not my purpose to outline in 
detail the solution to both problems detected by Prinz in the James-
Lange theory of emotions, but my purpose is to show that his interest is 
reworking certain aspects of this theory so that it can appear as entirely 
non-cognitivist. My hypothesis is that this commitment to rehabilitate 
James’s theory makes Jesse Prinz subject (regardless of being successful 
in his venture) to the same criticisms that Wittgenstein expressed about 
James.
2 Wittgenstein’s Expressivism in Remarks on the 
 Philosophy of Psychology
The notes Wittgenstein composed during the years of 1946-1948, 
compiled and published in two volumes under the title Remarks on 
Philosophy of Psychology, admittedly attest that Wittgenstein felt very 
encouraged by the James’s theory, particularly by the emphasis on 
expressive behaviors. Most of his criticisms, however, intended to show 
that James had confused the logical connection between emotions and 
sensations (studied by the philosopher) with the empirical connection 
between emotions and sensations (object of study of science). The 
references to Principles of Psychology are quite numerous and appear in 
several works by Wittgenstein.14
In an important passage from a manuscript dating from the early 
1930’s, Wittgenstein says:
How necessary is the work of philosophy is shown by the psychology 
of James. Psychology, he says, is a science, but James hardly discusses 
scientific issues. His movements are mere attempts to extricate himself 
of the webs of metaphysics in which he is stuck. He still cannot walk or 
fly, but only move. Not that it is not interesting. Just is not a scientific 
activity.15
This passage gives us an interesting diagnosis of what Wittgenstein 
thought about James’s approach regarding the nature of emotions. What 
James does, Wittgenstein says, is not “science,” but something closer 
to philosophy. Moreover, as a philosophical position, it should take into 
account some important features regarding the use of psychological or 
emotional terms, especially about addressing the problem of so-called 
14 At least in the Philosophical Grammar, in the Brown Book, in the two volumes of Remarks 
on Philosophy of Psychology, in the Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology and in the 
Philosophical Investigations.
15 HILMY, S. The Later Wittgenstein. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987, apud GOODMAN, R., op. cit., p. 63.
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“privacy” of the internal or mental phenomena. In other words, a first 
objection to James’s theory is that it is committed to a mistaken view 
about the access to the “subjective mental states.” Indeed, James seems 
to endorse the description-expression dichotomy, where these categories 
are self-exclusive. As we shall see in the next section, there are strong 
reasons to believe that James’s error was to assume a descriptivist 
position about the internal processes that completely exclude the 
possibility of considering the expressiveness of mental states.
Considerations about the nature of the mind as if it were an “inner 
world” to which only the owner has access are commonly found in 
philosophical literature. Now, if only the “possessor” may have a given 
experience, it seems plausible that only he or she can know that 
experience, and thus someone else would logically be prevented from 
having the same experience or taking “a peek into other people’s 
minds.”16 The private ownership of the experience, however, is an illusion. 
The “epistemic privacy,” as Peter Hacker says, “is equally illusory, but 
there are various props that keeps it standing, and each of these deceiver 
pillars must be removed.”17 However, the access to “subjective mental 
states” is different from the access to common sensory data, such as when 
we have sensory access to an apple, for example. In addition, there are 
deep differences between the grammatical usage of psychological verbs 
in the first and the third persons that James seems not to have noticed.
Psychological verbs are characterized by the fact that the third person 
of the present is to be identified by observation, the first person not. 
Sentences in third person of the present: information. In the first person 
present, expression. (Not quite right).18
It is possible to argue, therefore, that James’s mistake was to 
think that we can (perceptually) observe the evolution of our pains (or 
fluctuation of our emotions), when in fact we can only report the way 
we feel. It follows that it is impossible for someone to state something 
like “He feels terrible pains, but unfortunately he is not aware of them” 
or “I feel terrible pains, but as I am not aware of them, it is very yummy 
feel them.”19 According to Wittgenstein, emotions are conceptually distinct 
from “sensations” and “emotional dispositions” and can be divided into two 
groups: “direct emotions” (with object) e “indirect emotions” (without object), 
16 NEVES FILHO, E. O Paradoxo de Moore: uma análise de diferentes soluções. Pelotas: Edufpel, 
2012.
17 HACKER, P. Wittgenstein: On Human Nature. New York: Routledge, 1999, p 10-14.
18 WITTGENSTEIN, L. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
Vol. II, 1991, § 63.
19 GOODMAN, R. Wittgenstein and William James. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
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the common criteria being “genuine duration,” “typical course,” and “typical 
behaviors” (crying when you are sad, for example).20 Emotional concepts 
applied in the first person singular do not tell anything about the external 
world. Psychological words aim to report how we feel about something.
The central idea is that subjective mental states are intersubjectively 
accessible in most cases by observing the characteristic expressive 
behavior. That is, we can have some access to emotional states of others 
from the way they behave and from the use of psychological terms that 
replace “primitive natural expressions.” This point is directly related to 
the idea that, when it comes to “psychological verbs” in the third person, 
“we have information,” and therefore verification (i.e., they can be verified 
by facts), but when it comes to “psychological verbs” in the first person 
“we have expression,”21 and therefore no verification, but adequacy 
to habitual behaviors. In this sense, Wittgenstein seems to be closer 
to traditional expressivism, since he emphasizes the non-informative 
expressiveness of mental states.
In the Philosophical Investigations, however, Wittgenstein is especially 
clear about what he thought about the linguistic private possession of 
experiences or internal sensations:
A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame 
and punish himself; he can ask himself a question and answer it […]. But 
is it also conceivable that there be language in which a person could write 
down or give voice to his inner experiences, his feelings, moods, and so 
on a for his own use? – Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? 
– But that is not what I mean. The words of this language are to refer to 
what only the speaker can know – to his immediate private sensations. 
Therefore, another person cannot understand the language.22
A private language would be what a speaker has and only he or she 
can have. However, if the psychological terms do not “describe” internal 
emotional states (in most cases) in the same way that we describe “an 
apple,” then it would be a mistake to think that a philosophical approach 
(which is descriptive, and not explanatory) could explain any essential 
feature of emotions. James’s misconception would be caught up in a 
common mistake of philosophers: “describe all internal events in the same 
way that science often describe external objects, or even, to think that 
emotional states can be analyzed atomically. The correct way of thinking 
that would be paying attention to expressive behaviors. As Schulte says, 
“there is something that can be regarded as mediating between the 
 
20 WITTGENSTEIN, L. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, § 63.
21 Idem, Zettel, London: Basil Blackwell, 1967, § 472.
22 Idem, Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2009, § 243.
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subjective and the objective, between the inner and the outer, namely 
our typical expressive behavior.”23
The typical expressive behaviors, according to Wittgenstein, are 
logically (or conceptually, grammatically, but not physically) connected to 
certain emotions. This might suggest that Wittgenstein was mistakenly 
advocating here for some kind of cognitivism about emotions. However, 
one must note that the conceptual element claimed by Wittgenstein applies 
only to the relationship between a characteristic expressive behavior and 
an emotion. There is no problem in considering emotions as fundamentally 
natural, or even in response to stimuli or bodily changes. The problem 
is the grammatical illusions to which we are subject when supposedly 
“describing” these phenomena.
One of the most famous passages of Wittgenstein’s work regarding 
the description-expression dichotomy is the comparison of “a cry of 
fear” with a statement in the first person such as “I’m scared.” This 
important passage of the Philosophical Investigations is responsible, 
according to David Macarthur,24 for leading a number of influential 
commentators to consider the Austrian philosopher as an expressivist 
along traditional lines. The misconception of these commentators is, 
as we shall see, not taking into consideration the fact that traditional 
expressivism ends up endorsing some of the assumptions of his main 
opponent, descriptivism. Moreover, in the second part of the Philosophical 
Investigations, Wittgenstein explicitly defends the wide variety of 
uses of psychological terms in language games, something that both 
expressivists and descriptivists would be unwilling to endorse.
On the other hand, we can consider this particular way of 
conceiving of the use of psychological verbs as a kind of naturalism. 
Contemporary philosophers generally agree that there are at least two 
kinds of naturalism – reductive and the non-reductive. Wittgensteinian 
philosophers, such José Medina (2004)25, are convinced that there is in 
On Certainty a very promising form of non-reductive naturalism that is 
heavily focused on the social. Medina has argued that social naturalism 
(inspired by the idea of “second nature”) has several advantages 
over other kinds of naturalism (such as Quine’s, for example). The 
main advantage, Medina argues, is precisely the fact that social 
naturalism is based on a kind of methodological pluralism, rather than 
 
23 SCHULTE, J. Experience and Expression: Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 36.
24 MACARTHUR, D. “Wittgenstein and Expressivism”. In: WHITING, D. (Ed.). The Later Witt- 
genstein on Language. London: Palgrave, 2009, p. 81-95.
25 MEDINA, J. “Wittgenstein’s Social Naturalism: The Idea of ‘Second Nature’ after the 
Philosophical Investigations”. In: MOYAL-SHARROCK, D. (Ed.). The Third Wittgenstein. New 
York: Ashgate, 2004, p. 79-92.
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a methodological monism derived from the positivist thesis of the unity 
of science.
The philosophy of the later Wittgenstein has inspired a naturalism that 
avoids the pitfalls of reductionism. The later Wittgenstein rejects the 
idea that there is a single method, or set of rules, that defines the study 
of human behaviour, thus advocating a methodological pluralism. He 
argues that our rule-following practices constitute a sui generis domain 
that is not reducible to causal regularities.26
An interesting aspect of “Wittgenstein’s social naturalism” about 
the use of “psychological verbs” is the fact that the concepts seem to 
be inextricably linked to the phenomena – they “emerge,” so to speak, 
from our forms of life and are expressed in our language-games.27 This is 
especially clear in the famous passage of the Philosophical Investigations: 
“What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human 
beings, not curiosities, however, but facts that no one has doubted which 
have escaped notice only because they are always before our eyes.”28
My suspicion is that it seems possible to show that Wittgenstein 
also endorses a kind of naturalism in the Philosophical Investigations, 
especially when he discusses the biological roots of our concepts and 
the crucial role played by the laws of nature. Many concepts depend on 
the laws of nature. What would be the concept of “weight,” Wittgenstein 
asks, if the mass of the objects was inexplicably variable? The distinctive 
peculiarity of Wittgenstein’s approach is the assertion that philosophy 
should not attempt to explain the formation of the concepts by facts 
of nature, but instead, philosophy should seek to emphasize the very 
“contingency of our concepts.”29
Concepts are as “human tools” naturally developed within culture 
itself. The rules of language arise in the use of language, and not before 
it. The concepts are “rules” that express their own logic of articulation 
and license, so to speak, the necessary connections between them. 
While for James and Prinz everything is reducible to experience, for 
Wittgenstein, human life is inextricably linked to concepts, meanings 
and rules, or, to use one of Wittgenstein’s favorite words, human life is 
inextricably attached to a “grammar.” It is in this sense that grammar 
seems to determine “the kind of thing that some object is.” Therefore, 
26 MEDINA, J. “Wittgenstein’s Social Naturalism: The Idea of ‘Second Nature’ after the 
Philosophical Investigations”. In: MOYAL-SHARROCK, D. (Ed.). The Third Wittgenstein. New 
York: Ashgate, 2004, p. 81.
27 Medina also tries to show that, in his later writings, Wittgenstein sketches a provocative 
kind of social naturalism with his remarks on ‘natural history’. See ibid., p. 80. 
28 WITTGENSTEIN, L. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2009, § 415.
29 Ibid., p. 221.
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in a genuine philosophical research on emotions, we should focus on the 
inferential articulation of our concepts, that is, in what may or not “count” 
conceptually as an emotion.
3 A New Kind of Expressivism?
The psychological terms used to denote feelings and emotions are 
connected with what Wittgenstein called “characteristic expressive behavior,” 
including facial expressions. As we said before, the psychological terms 
replace “primitive natural expressions.” The term “natural expressions,” 
however, appears in a key context of the Philosophical Investigations:
Now, what about the language that describes my inner experiences and 
which only I myself can understand? How do I use words to stand for my 
sensations? – As we ordinarily do? Then are my words for sensations tied 
up with my natural expressions of sensation? In that case, my language 
is not a ‘private’ one. Someone else might understand it as well as I. – 
But suppose I didn’t have any natural expression for the sensation, but 
only had the sensation? Now I simply associate names with sensations 
and use these names in descriptions.30
The idea is that in public language (the language that we all 
understand), words used to describe sensations (pains, tickles, colors, 
etc.) are connected with “natural expressions of sensations.” Such 
expressions are, obviously, bodily expressions, like groans and grimaces 
of pain, for example. The nature of the connection between words and 
expressive behavior is indicated by how we learn such expressions 
through training or by the acquisition of primitive language. A mother, 
for example, knows when her child feels pain – and she is able to convey 
the use of the word “pain” – when the child points to one of his or her 
members when the mother asks “where does it hurt?” It seems obvious 
that the child learns to use the word “pain” in these and numerous other 
similar situations.
In this sense, the practices of the linguistic community, linked to 
natural expressions of pain, function as the background that ensures 
(licenses) that the word “pain” will play the role for which it was 
designed. Therefore, psychological and expressive terms such “pain,” 
function as substitutes for “expressions of primitive and natural feelings.” 
Psychological terms, as substitutes for natural expressions, acquire a new 
form of “expressive behavior,” that is, they form what we call “second 
nature.” The term “pain” acquires a new form of “pain behavior.” This 
30 WITTGENSTEIN, L. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2009, § 256.
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way of thinking about language does not imply the idea that “pain” 
signifies “cry,” as James thought. The verbal expression of pain replaces 
the crying, but does not describe it.31
Of course, this could suggest that Wittgenstein is endorsing the 
descriptivist fallacy, according to which words show a uniform usage. 
However, this is certainly not the case, since, instead of considering the 
terms “description” and “expression” as mutually exclusive, Wittgenstein 
says, in the Philosophical Investigations, that they are members of the 
same inferential network.
Traditional expressivism often argues that some sentences that 
superficially appear as descriptions are actually expressions. Expressions 
have two basic characteristics: (1) the target-sentences are lacking 
in truth-values and (2) the target-sentences “express,” but do not 
“describe,” mental states or processes. David Macarthur, however, draws 
attention to the fact that Wittgenstein does not identify the sentence “I’m 
scared” with a cry of fear, but rather compares the description of the mental 
state with a cry of fear. The suggestion is that sometimes this kind of “speech 
act” is closer to a scream (an expression) and sometimes it (the act) is far 
from a cry (a description).
If I tell you “I have been afraid of his arrival all day long” – I could, after 
all, go into detail: Immediately upon awakening I thought... Then I 
considered.... Time and again I looked out of the window, etc., etc. This 
could be called a report about fear. But if I then said to somebody, “I am 
afraid...” – would that be as it were a groan of fear, or an observation 
about my condition? – It could be either one, or the other: It might simply 
be a groan of fear; but I might also want to report to someone else how 
I have been spending the day. And if I were now to say to him: “I have 
spent the whole day in fear (here details might be added) and now too I 
am full of anxiety” – what are we to say about this mixture of report and 
statement? Well what should we say other than that, here we have the 
use of the word “fear” in front of us?32
The general idea seems to be that, instead of assuming the traditional 
description-expression dichotomy, where “being a description” naturally 
excludes “being an expression,” Wittgenstein would have sought to 
show (in the second volume of Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, 
but more evidently in the Philosophical Investigations) that the error 
lies in trying to impose crystal clear grammatical limits to each of these 
expressions. According to Macarthur, the correct way of conceiving of 
31 WITTGENSTEIN, L. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2009, § 244.
32 Idem, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1989, 
Vol. II, § 156.
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Wittgenstein’s treatment of psychological terms is through a line ranging 
from a spontaneous response to a given situation (a cry of fear) to the 
highly specialized response that can be evaluated in terms of truth-values 
(a sentence like “I’m scared”).
This suggests that some uses of sentences with psychological verbs 
in the first person sometimes function as expressions and sometimes 
function as descriptions. It is likely that everyone agrees that a cry of 
terror in the night is not a description of a mental state, but a spontaneous 
behavior whose purpose is to express the feeling of fear. However, it seems 
more difficult to reach a consensus about the equivocal uses of a sentence 
such as “I’m scared.” What corroborates Macarthur’s exegesis is precisely the 
idea that the sentence “I’m scared” does not always work as a description, 
but, in some occasions, has a content that can be evaluated in terms of 
truth or falsity and therefore can function as a description of somebody’s 
mental state.
The error consists of not perceiving that in some cases the sentence 
“I’m scared” is used as a description of a mental state, and that, therefore, 
we are tempted to assume that it is always used as a description. When 
we are deceived by the surface grammar of psychological terms, we are 
subject to endorse, therefore, the descriptivist fallacy (the mistake of 
thinking that the term “description” has a uniform usage). According 
to Wittgenstein, when I use the sentence “I’m scared,” I can be simply 
expressing my fear through a linguistic form of behavior, which can 
be evaluated in terms of truth or falsity. But I can also express my fear 
through something similar to an “Ouch!,” which cannot be evaluated in 
terms of truth or falsity.
Macarthur’s aim, then, is to show that Wittgenstein conceives of 
the intersubjective transmission of mental states in both modes: the 
descriptive mode and the expressive mode. Nevertheless, in normal 
cases, where a sentence like “I have a headache” is used without 
any process of reflection and self-observation, a mental state is being 
expressed and, therefore, this is not a genuine description.33 In other 
words, the reports of my mental states have an assertoric dimension and 
an expressive dimension. On the far side of the scream (the assertoric 
dimension), it is possible to show that certain expressions of mental 
states function as descriptions.
Suppose that John is part of a group of climbers and that at some 
point, with the proximity of the most dangerous part of the climb, the 
leader, worried about the safety of the group, asks “How are you feeling?” 
In this case, if John replies “I’m scared,” then the expression of his mental 
33 CHILD, W. Wittgenstein. Porto Alegre: Artmed, 2013, p. 178.
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state functions as a description, because the objective is to communicate 
to the leader how he is feeling with the proximity of the most dangerous 
section of the climb. In this example offered by David Macarthur, John’s 
answer is more distant from the cry of fear. This is what Wittgenstein 
claimed to be the “difference of purpose” between the expression of fear 
“I’m scared!” and the description of fear “I’m scared.”34
From a strictly Wittgensteinian point of view, the expressivist would 
be correct when he considers that the surface grammar of statements like 
“I’m scared” tends to lead us to the mistake of thinking that they always 
function as a description. However, the expressivist error is to assume 
that this kind of statement never functions as a description. By doing so, 
the expressivist is overlooking the deep grammar of the psychological 
terms and, therefore, tends to lose sight of the wide variety of uses that 
determine the meaning of certain expressions. According to Macarthur, 
the traditional expressivist seems to assume the dogma that to “be able 
to have a truth-value is equivalent to be a description, such that lose the 
descriptive functionality is to lose the possibility to have a truth value.”
Wittgenstein’s position in the Philosophical Investigations, therefore, 
is slightly different from the traditional expressivist position because 
(i) it assumes that the description-expression dichotomy is inadequate 
and (ii) it assumes that a mental state can be described, even though in 
very specific contexts. It is obvious that, to assume that the expression 
of mental states always works in the same way (in the same way that 
expressions with no truth-value such as “Ouch” or “Aargh!” work) is 
to ignore the logical and grammatical differences between them and 
the limiting cases (non-declaratives) like the scream of fear. Therefore, 
Wittgenstein cannot be regarded as a traditional expressivist, since, 
although he recognizes the expressive dimension of statements about 
mental states, the traditional expressivist does not recognize the 
assertoric dimension of these expressions and ignores the descriptive 
employment of mental states. The traditional expressivist sees as a 
difference in kind what is actually just a difference in degree35.
Therefore, it is possible to show that Wittgenstein was not an 
expressivist in the traditional mold. However, this does not mean that 
Wittgenstein’s stance is not expressivist in another sense. Expressions 
continue to have two basic characteristics: (1) some manifestations are 
lacking in truth-values and (2) some manifestations “express,” but do 
not “describe” mental states or processes. Provided that expressivism 
is also a kind of naturalism, it seems possible to show that Wittgenstein 
34 WITTGENSTEIN, L. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, § 735.
35 Ibid., § 737.
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endorses a kind of naturalism (as suggested by Medina) about the use of 
psychological terms and how they are incorporated by replacing natural 
expressions (primitive behaviors) with language sentences.
Given the preliminary discussion, we can now turn to consider 
the position of James and Prinz about the use of psychological terms. 
In Wittgenstein’s perspective (in the last writings), James’s, and 
consequently also Prinz’s, error was thinking that all “inner experiences” 
can be “described,” because in fact some are immediately “expressed” by 
psychological terms that replace “primitive or natural behaviors.” Instead 
of “crying” because he or she “feels pain,” an adult and competent 
user of language simply says “I feel pain,” even though crying and 
pain are obviously physiological in nature. That is why, in cases of pain, 
our “language-game” is an extension of a primitive behavior (it is an 
instinct)36. Therefore, emotions are not artificial devices for others to know 
our emotional states, but rather, emotions are natural devices.
The centrality of Wittgenstein’s approach in the various uses of 
psychological terms leads us to recognize the impossibility of developing 
a theory of psychological concepts, since it would always remain 
incomplete. However, the “logical” or “grammar” sense of Wittgenstein’s 
research (in contrast to the empirical sense of James’s research) can be 
seen in the fact that “pain” is not a mere behavior or expression of pain 
– because there are significant differences between “feeling a pain” and 
“pretending to feel a pain.” Nevertheless, pain remains connected to its 
expression, grammatically or logically. Here is an important difference: 
Wittgenstein’s purpose is to investigate the logical or grammatical 
connections between expressive behaviors and psychological terms used 
to denote emotions. The interest of James and Prinz is to investigate the 
physical connections between expressive behaviors and emotions.
The grammatical meaning of Wittgenstein’s research marks a major 
methodological difference in relation to James’s work. Indeed, the typical 
behaviors expressive of grief, such as “hiccups,” “chest tightness,” 
“tears,” etc., are actually “criteria” of grief, but “grief” itself is not 
composed of such feelings or sensations, as James had asserted. This is 
what allows us to say that “hope,” for example, is not the sum of different 
sensations. A person who feels “depression” has not depressive feelings 
in parts of his or her body, although some expressive behaviors typical 
of depression are quite apparent. This means that depression (and the 
same goes for hope) is not the kind of thing that could be strictly localized 
in the same way that a knee pain is located in the knee37. The aim is 
36 WITTGENSTEIN, L. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, § 151.
37 Ibid., §§ 438, 448, 449, 451.
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to show what can be considered as an emotion or as a sensation. This 
aim, however, seems to be the same one found in the Remarks on the 
Philosophy of Psychology and in the Philosophical Investigations.
“Crying” is a criterion of sadness, but it is not a necessary or sufficient 
condition for sadness (someone can cry and not be sad or not be sad and 
cry). However, “crying” is logically associated with sadness, because 
the concept of “sadness” is necessary in contexts that include our 
natural propensity to cry in unfortunate situations. Bodily sensations 
are taken (grammatically) as criteria and not as parts that make up 
sadness. Prinz’s difficulty (as a self-proclaimed heir to James) is linked 
to the fact that he confounds the conceptual aspects of emotions (from 
a purely philosophical point of view) with the physical aspects (from a 
scientific point of view). That is, when he takes a peculiar methodological 
monism (a peculiar kind of naturalism), he seems to be committed to a 
misconception about emotions.
If Wittgenstein is correct, Prinz’s misconception lies precisely in 
thinking that expressive behaviors are necessary and sufficient to 
determine or identify an emotion. In Wittgenstein’s perspective, expressive 
behaviors are criteria, but not necessary or sufficient conditions. Moreover, 
if Prinz intends to advocate for a kind of non-cognitivism to support the 
idea that emotional responses vary from culture to culture, so it does not 
seem necessary to endorse a kind of reductionist naturalism. Apparently 
“Wittgenstein’s Social Naturalism” could serve equally well for this purpose, 
since a significant portion of the uses of psychological terms is entirely non-
cognitivist.
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